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IN PURSUIT OF TRUTH 
 
RACHEL E. HOLMES & TORIA A. JOHNSON 
 
IN THE PAST FEW YEARS a wave of right-wing populism has swept the western world 
and we have seen emotions take the political helm. The voting booth triumphs of 
Donald Trump in the United States and Brexit in the United Kingdom were affective: 
they stoked racist, sexist and nativist sentiments while campaigning on social, 
economic and legal issues. In short: they moved the electorate, and thereby gained 
control. As Hillary Clinton explains, these tactics are designed to ‘keep people off 
balance and make them think that this will, if not make their lives better, make them 
feel better’ (emphasis ours).1 We might therefore say that feelings brought Trump to 
power and propelled the Brexit campaign in Britain. We might equally suggest that 
they continue to drive these political and legislative agendas. The Trump 
administration has already demonstrated an unprecedented reliance on the executive 
order as an exercise of presidential will, issuing an abundance of executive actions – 
legally enforceable actions – that have predominantly targeted Muslims, immigrants, 
LGBTQI+ people, and women, groups who were also the focus of emotionally-
charged, hateful rhetoric on the campaign trail.
2
 Meanwhile, in the UK, the Brexiteers 
continue to insist, as they did throughout the referendum campaign to leave the 
European Union, upon the need to reclaim ‘sovereignty’. This is an amorphous 
concept which they characterize, in explicitly legal terms, as the act of taking 
jurisdiction (and thereby control) back from the courts of the European Union; in 
practice it has come to stand in popular parlance for a certain brand of nationalistic 
fellow-feeling.
3
 Feelings also inform the forces resisting those agendas. Consider, for 
example, the crowd-sourced legal action to challenge the British government’s 
attempts to initiate Brexit without parliamentary involvement.
4
 Or the countless 
immigration lawyers who waited for hours with fellow protesters in American airports 
following the issuance of Trump’s ‘travel’ ban, ready to represent those whose arrival 
in the country might be impeded.
5
 These cases all dealt with constitutional issues, and 
even in the word ‘constitutional’, a word we have heard a great deal in recent months, 
we can see the interplay of emotional and legal connotations. This word encompasses 
a technical legal meaning in the notion of a country’s founding legal document or 
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principles, but it also bears the idea of a human constitution, a disposition or 
emotional make-up. Ours is a moment in which we are forcefully reminded of the 
emotional content of law.
 6
  
As the editors of the present collection of essays, we started out by wondering 
what we might gain – both as scholars and as citizens in a so-called post-truth society 
– from a re-examination of the idea that law is, and always has been, saturated with 
emotional humanity. Since Plato, the dominant cultural narrative about law and 
emotion across the west has enforced their binary opposition. This narrative figures 
law and lawmakers as explicitly rational and impartial, in contrast with emotions, 
which are (in this formulation) typically branded as irrational, unreasonable and 
unruly.
7
 This is a legal and cultural fiction we buy into – both on an institutional and a 
personal level – for the reassurance and sense of order it offers. But to what extent is 
such a dichotomy useful? Should emotion be wholly isolated from law, and is this 
even possible? Are there ways in which acknowledging emotion’s role in legal 
matters might be both desirable, and beneficial? As a result of the prevailing bias that 
situates emotionality outside the reasonable sphere of law, Susan A. Bandes explains, 
‘The legal system has long been inhospitable terrain for the study of emotion.’8 
Nonetheless researchers have, more recently, begun to acknowledge the relationship 
between law and emotion and to see the terms as productively linked, rather than 
mutually exclusive.
9
 With this Special Issue, we join a growing body of scholarship 
that argues for ‘the very real but often neglected reality of the emotional context that 
precedes, surrounds, and follows judgments and decisions in law and legal process’, 
and attempts to bring emotion productively into legal studies.
10
  
While we identify insight in emotion, our aim here is not to abjure concerns 
about the place of the passions in public life; we do, however, want to do away with 
the stark dichotomy between law and emotion in favour of a more nuanced 
understanding of their interrelation. By highlighting the extent to which emotional 
agents shape and interact with law, we mean to explore the competing aims and 
motivations that make legal concepts like ‘truth’ and ‘justice’ subjective and unstable; 
we refer to the human intentions that infuse law-making. We refer also to the human 
actors involved at all levels of legal process – whether judges, lawyers, jurors, 
lawmakers or lawbreakers – and the emotionality of their experience. Both the legal 
and the emotional spheres work towards truth in some way, trying to assert or to 
locate truth, to communicate truthfully (and to know if or when others are doing so), 
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and to preserve truth as an element that underpins stable society. These pursuits of 
truth are presumed to be independent, but – as we asked our contributors, and 
ourselves – in what contexts do legal and emotional truth-seeking intersect? In what 
contexts do these interrelations between law and emotion produce conflict? Or 
become dangerous and detrimental? What role does power play in determining these 
relationships and our perceptions of them? In which contexts might emotion play a 
productive and beneficial role in legal experience?
11
 Are these interrelations 
historically and culturally specific, or transhistorical and universal? And how can 
literature contribute to these conversations? 
Our motivation for bringing together this collection of essays is threefold. 
First, we establish the historical and cultural contingency of the interrelation of law 
and emotion by demonstrating the rich and varied contexts in which these spheres 
interact in early modern Europe. This was a period dealing with the after-effects of 
the Protestant Reformation, in which ideas of truth were particularly vexed, but early 
modern Europe was also a space and time that saw the creation of many of the legal 
and emotional precedents that shaped modern society. Both explicitly and implicitly, 
the material collected here speaks to our second aim, which is to suggest that gaining 
a better understanding of legal and emotional history can improve our understanding 
of our current emotional and legal climate. For example, exploring the early modern 
suspicion of rhetorical skill and the potential it holds for emotional manipulation goes 
some way to explaining why such suspicions about emotion continue to be 
ineradicable. Likewise, unpicking the longstanding historical association of 
passionate responses with rash action reveals the (often heavily gendered) 
assumptions about the risks of emotional decision-making. Finally – and perhaps 
most importantly – we demonstrate that there is a clear value in approaching all of 
these issues specifically through literature.  
The resource represented by imaginative literature has thus far been largely 
overlooked by scholars working at the interdiscipline of law and emotion. With 
contributions from historicist literary scholars of England, Spain and France, this 
Special Issue of Forum for Modern Language Studies, ‘In Pursuit of Truth: Law and 
Emotion in Early Modern Europe’, brings together new scholarship that explores 
questions of legal and emotional truth-seeking and truth-telling.
12
 The seven essays 
that follow consider how truth is defined, whether it can be determined, and how it is 
represented – with particular interest in literary representations. Our contributors 
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traverse the fallibility of human sensory experience, institutional attempts to regulate 
and control emotions, the use of language or rhetoric to establish emotional 
relationships in epistolary, poetic and political exchanges, the ease with which 
rhetoric’s capacity for persuasion can be turned to manipulation in court and culture, 
and suggest that emotions might in fact hold a positive place in deliberation. The 
historical focus of this Special Issue is specific, but the ideas explored in these essays 
extend beyond their temporal and cultural bounds. As we establish at the opening of 
this Introduction, the issues pursued here are as resonant in contemporary debates as 
they are insights into the debates of the past. 
* 
This Special Issue is grounded in the simple, but surprisingly contested belief that 
where we find law, we invariably find emotion, and where we find emotion, we also 
often find legal structures or ideas being invoked. As Richard Wiener, Brian 
Bornstein and Amy Voss asserted just over ten years ago, the study of law ‘for too 
long […] ignored the obvious and insisted upon studying eyewitness identification, 
jury decision making, compliance with the law, judicial decision making, and many 
other types of legal judgments, as if they occurred in the absence of emotion and 
motivation’ (emphasis ours).13 While scholars such as Martha Nussbaum have 
convincingly challenged the binary opposition between law and emotion, insisting 
that emotion plays an essential and often beneficial role in deliberation and decision 
making, such thinking continues to meet with resistance.
14
 However, efforts to bring 
law and emotion together are now becoming increasingly popular in legal studies, in 
the behavioural sciences, and, most recently, in historical scholarship.
15
 The essays 
collected here approach intersections between law and emotion for the first time from 
the vantage point of literary criticism, fusing the methodologies of the fields of law 
and literature, and emotions scholarship.
16
  
Law and literature as an interdiscipline has been characterized virtually since 
its inception by methodological diversity and perpetual redefinition but, with Bradin 
Cormack, we take the view that law and literature exist ‘in a complex but not 
oppositional relation to one another’.17 In his own work on the early modern period, 
Cormack situates literature as part of humanistic culture more broadly, within which 
we also place emotions. The early modern period has been a significant focus of much 
scholarship in law and literature and the history of emotions, but research in this area 
has not yet explicitly combined the two approaches.
18
 It is our contention, however, 
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that imaginative literature offers a vital contribution to the interdiscipline of law and 
emotion as well as to each of those fields by illuminating some of the inherent 
messiness produced when law, emotion and humanity come together.
 
 
In part, the scepticism about emotion’s impact on law – in which emotions are 
held to be ‘individual, arbitrary, unanalysable, and ultimately a threat to the proper 
functioning of the legal system’ – reveals a larger concern that has dominated 
emotions scholarship.
19
 Since the field’s inception, emotions scholars have worked to 
demonstrate the possibility of producing rigorous scholarship on a set of subjective 
and shifting concepts and/or experiences. This desire to avoid the appearance of 
‘subjective’ analysis has led to a field-wide focus on sources and methodologies that 
seem capable of containing a concept as unwieldy as ‘emotion’. As a result, and 
following the seminal work of Peter and Carol Stearns, scholars have tended to 
distinguish between ‘emotional experience’, which might involve inchoate, 
subjective, often inexpressible feelings, and the social, cultural, political and religious 
frameworks that typically surround these feelings. For Stearns and Stearns, 
‘emotionology’ offers a way of accessing emotion through ‘the attitudes or standards 
that a society, or a definable group within a society, maintains toward basic emotions 
and their appropriate expression’. 20 This move – intended as it was to push emotions 
studies towards concepts that could be identified and analysed in concrete terms, has 
since prompted many other emotional frameworks to facilitate research. After 
‘emotionology’, William Reddy challenged the idea that emotion exists beyond the 
language used to express it. His work emphasized instead ‘emotives’ (the speech used 
to describe emotion) and traced the ‘emotional regimes’ (sets of emotional rituals and 
practices that support political regimes) they produce.
21
 Barbara Rosenwein proposed 
that we think in terms of ‘emotional communities’, tracing groups with close social 
contact in order to decipher a shared set of emotional norms. Each of these 
frameworks has tried to find ways of balancing the multivalency and mutability of 
human emotion with the need for stable analysis, searching for something that is 
‘more accessible than emotional experience’ while still contributing to our 
understanding of emotion’s impact.22 This methodological instinct has perhaps 
pushed scholars away from creative material and towards material that is sometimes 
imagined as more ‘objective’ in its recording of events (and emotions): material like 
legal records, chronicles, diaries or news media.  
 6 
Literature has occupied similarly unsteady ground in legal scholarship 
precisely due to its imaginative nature. This is particularly evident in the early stages 
of the law and literature movement, where literature is frequently conflated with ‘the 
humane’. Richard Posner, a judge, like many others considers the only real benefits of 
a ‘literary sensibility’ to the legal imagination to be ‘enabl[ing] judges to write better 
opinions and lawyers to present their cases more effectively’.23 Posner here is 
speaking about the benefits of rhetorical skill, but he further alludes to those who 
claim ‘that the study of literature in general […] can humanize the practice of law and 
the outlook of judges’.24 This perspective uses the word ‘humanize’ to signal 
compassionate imagination; it also conceives of this as something external to law, 
placing the burden of such imagining on the external literary influence. In these 
comments, Posner effectively feeds into a prominent strand of law and literature 
scholarship which Julie Stone Peters, following Jane Baron, terms ‘humanist’, and 
which uses literature as ‘the most human of the humane arts’ to challenge the 
perceived rigour and violence of law.
25
 Following this line of thinking, literature is 
figured as an ethical supplement to law: it becomes ‘a source of truth which can help 
to analyze and criticize the law’.26 The truth that literature allegedly speaks, because it 
is human, is assumed to be, at least in part, emotional, and this association between 
imaginative literature and emotion has survived the adapting taxonomies and 
methodologies of law and literature scholarship.
27
 As a result of this assimilation of 
literature and emotion, the critical category of ‘emotion’ is, on the whole, as 
conspicuously absent from recent collections that track the presents and futures of law 
and literature as literature is from law and emotion scholarship.
28
 Greta Olson asks 
whether law and literature has, in fact, become law and emotion, a question which 
itself perfectly encapsulates the continued assimilation of the literary and the 
affective.
29
 However, such assimilation further elides the broader epistemological 
value of literature, itself a source and storehouse of knowledge not unlike any other 
historical or cultural text.
30
  
Erin Sullivan has recently argued in favour of ‘the crucial role literary sources 
and methods can play in the field of emotions history’, while also noting that these 
sources and methods are often overlooked, much as they have been by lawyers and 
legal historians.
31
 Sullivan notes that, ‘Fenced off as [literary sources] are from many 
of the cultural demands of “the real” – in particular the expectation that the opinions 
and beliefs voiced in a text will correspond directly with a particular historical person 
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or event – some scholars have perhaps seen them as less reliable sources.’32 This 
emphasis on ‘the real’ as something that necessarily excludes imaginative literature 
has undoubtedly affected the status of literary material in emotions studies, just as it 
has in law and literature scholarship. Equally, this narrow perspective on the ‘reality’ 
or ‘truth’ of a text unnecessarily limits our picture of the overarching emotional and 
cultural landscapes in which these works are situated. It is reductive to assume that 
imaginative literature has no relation to the context of its production, or to the 
emotional or legal realities of its historical or cultural moment. Literature, like 
emotional humanity, like law, is embedded in and part of reality, and it has always 
been a site of exploration.  
The issues that we have outlined are some of the overarching and 
transhistorical claims of theoretical discussions of law and literature and emotions 
studies, but of course neither law, nor literature, nor emotions are universal or 
transcendental. One challenge to taxonomizing approaches is that they assume 
consistency across geographical boundaries and throughout time. Bradin Cormack 
suggests that works of imaginative literature ‘offer ways of attending to experience 
that expose possibilities in the operative historical forms’ of the context of their 
production.
33
 Following this line of thinking, literary representation offers direct 
insights into – not reflections of – early modern thought, feeling, and understanding of 
the ‘possibilities’ of emotional humanity and legal experience. Cormack here in a 
sense collapses the distance between literature and ‘the real’, figuring the relation 
between the legal and literary as imaginative. By extension, then, literature provides a 
kind of space for exploring theories of social emotion and emotional reaction, 
exposing the possibilities of human interactions with legislative frameworks and 
practices. In what follows, we wish to turn our attention briefly, but more directly, to 
early modern Europe, and to give a more thorough consideration to some of the 
historical factors that combine to make the period so rich in questions of law, emotion 
and truth. The skepticism that we have traced in scholarly approaches to law and 
emotion – the insistence that emotions are ‘inconsistent with the very norms that 
govern and legitimate the judicial power and constitute its central disciplining 
measure: impartiality’34 – is equally at work in early modern writings.  
* 
Thomas Wright, an early modern Jesuit whose writing on the passions has always had 
a cross-disciplinary appeal to critics working on emotion, offers this legally-inflected 
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expression of the tension between passions and judgment in The Passions of the 
Minde in Generall (1604):  
 
Wise men confesse, and ignorant men prove that Passions blind their judgements and reason: 
for (as Saint Basil saide) Quemadmodum oculis turbatis, &c. As when the eyes are troubled, 
wee can not perceive exactly the objects of our sight; even so, when the heart is troubled, no 
man can come by the knowledge of trueth.
35
  
 
In his estimation, wise men ‘confesse’ their vulnerability to emotion, and recognize 
its capacity to influence ‘judgement’, whereas ignorant men ‘prove’ the same 
principle through their actions.
36
 Wright suggests that human emotion interferes with 
‘the knowledge of trueth’, which implies a ‘truth’ that exists beyond human agents, 
and beyond their fallibility. But for Wright, the threat of emotion sits not only in its 
capacity to trouble our hearts and thereby cloud our judgment: the larger threat is 
hermeneutic, rooted in the illegibility of emotions and our almost inevitable 
misperception. ‘As the motions of our Passions are hidde from our eyes,’ Wright 
explains, ‘so they are hard to bee perceived.’37 Toria Johnson’s essay, ‘“The Sinewes 
of Truth”: Binding Law and Emotion in Thomas Tomkis’s Lingua’, takes up the 
threat posed by the unreliability of sensory perception in English drama, 
demonstrating the dismissal and inadequacy of sensory evidence in Thomas Tomkis’s 
play Lingua, which charts its eponymous heroine’s suit to become a Sense. The play’s 
outcome, in Johnson’s reading, encapsulates Wright’s insistence that although there 
exists ‘a silent speech pronounced in [our] very countenances’, a mechanism by 
which ‘superiors may learne to conjecture the affections of their subjectes mindes’, 
there remains the risk of interpretative failure, a chance that emotional influencers 
will not be identified (and, therefore, will not be avoided).
38
 As Johnson 
demonstrates, in both the emotional and legal spheres this bears very real 
consequences. Ultimately, law has no more effective means of accessing or reading 
emotions than we do. As Wright acknowledges, we can only ‘marke in other men, 
their words, gestures, and actions’:39 we can only infer, conjecture, or construct their 
meaning and intention – but we can never know for certain. 
This distrust of emotion, the preoccupation with the fallibility of speech (upon 
which we must nonetheless rely), and the worry about correctly perceiving other 
people are all manifestations of an age-old preoccupation with truth that haunted 
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Wright and his European contemporaries. Following the Protestant Reformation, the 
truth of people’s words and convictions came under renewed scrutiny, becoming an 
area of conflict within and between Protestant and Catholic denominations, secular 
and ecclesiastical legal jurisdictions, and even families. Setting aside the foundational 
question about the ability of fallen man to perceive truth, truth claims were central to 
inter- and intra-denominational debates among Reformation and Counter-Reformation 
polemicists as truth and falsehood came to stand for each side of the religious 
divide.
40
 Andrea Frisch’s piece, ‘Emotional Justice in Agrippa d’Aubigné’s 
Tragiques’, shows this rhetorical move at work in early modern French poetry. For 
Frisch, the poetics of justice that operates in the Tragiques invites empathy and 
compassion for those who have fallen victim to the French Wars of Religion and 
encourages spiritual meditation on the ethics of conflict. In addition to such religious 
debates, such factiousness and suspicion has also been located at the heart of 
narratives of secularization, which see the questioning of faith emblematized by the 
Reformation as symptomatic of a broader shift away from the divine.
41
 Though a 
romanticized and contested vision, Stephen Greenblatt consequently sees the 
Renaissance as a turn towards the human and posits something of an epistemological 
cliff face between the interest of theologians and divines in truths beyond the worldly 
realm, and the unshackled explorations of natural philosophers, explorers and early 
economic thinkers that ensued.
42
 Historians and philosophers of science have 
therefore paid a great deal of attention to this shift ‘from Inquisition to inquiry’ – that 
is, a shift away from theological towards quasi-scientific or investigative pursuits of 
truth and its epistemic relatives, namely certainty, fact, probability, and proof or 
evidence.
43
 Barbara J. Shapiro has shown that these natural philosophical ideas about 
truth in early modern Europe were intimately bound in humanistic culture with those 
that we might otherwise consider to be exclusively spiritual, legal or emotional.
44
 
Disciplinary boundaries had not yet hardened into the impermeable divisions in which 
we specialize today. It is therefore in the context of such doubts and debates that we 
can situate the emphasis of early modern European humanists such as Sir Francis 
Bacon, Michel de Montaigne and Juan Luís Vives on truth and falsehood, as well as 
their interest in the interrelation of law and emotion.
45
  
In his essay on truth, Bacon describes ‘the Inquirie of Truth, which is the 
Love-making, or Wooing of it; The knowledge of Truth, which is the Presence of it; 
and the Beleefe of Truth, which is the Enjoying of it’, as ‘the Soveraigne Good of 
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humane Nature’.46 Truth in this model is theological, but also philosophical and 
somehow vital. Though he imagines the ‘Soveraigne Good of humane Nature’ in 
terms of living a good and honest life, as the best possible preparation for the final 
judgment, there exists also what Bacon terms the ‘Truth of civill Businesse’.47 This 
kind of truth concerns worldly interactions more than spiritual observances. ‘It will be 
acknowledged,’ he insists, ‘even by those, that practize it not, that clear and Round 
dealing’ – which is to say ‘the Truth of civill Businesse’ – ‘is the Honour of Mans 
Nature.’48 Men should deal with one another fairly and honestly, but Bacon’s 
discourse (like that of Montaigne and Vives) betrays a concern about the 
preponderance of, or at least the potential for, lies or untruths. ‘If a lie had no more 
faces but one, as truth hath,’ Montaigne asserts, ‘we should be in farre better termes 
than we are: For whatsoever a lier should say, we would take it in a contrarie sence. 
But the opposite of truth hath many-many shapes, and an undefinite field.’49 While 
Montaigne sees the ‘real truth of the thing’ as a force in itself to push out the lies, 
however, a greater degree of anxiety dominates both the essay itself, and an 
increasingly litigious and international early modern Europe preoccupied with proof, 
evidence and interpretation.  
Montaigne, himself once a magistrate at the Parlement of Bordeaux, takes up 
the challenges inherent to the pursuit of truth at various points in the Essays. Most 
pertinent to our discussion is his allusion to the case of Martin Guerre which, as 
perhaps the most famous case of imposture in European history, sits at the juncture of 
law and emotion.
50
 Martin Guerre went off to war and after a while returned to dwell 
with his wife Bertrande de Rols in their family home (or so everyone thought). 
Several years more went by before another man, claiming to be the real Martin, 
returned. And yet, the truth was not obvious: family, friends, doctors and cobblers 
gave conflicting testimony, and it remained unclear whether even Bertrande was fully 
aware of what had transpired. Had she been overwhelmed by loneliness in her 
husband’s absence and willingly accepted a replacement? Had she been deceived or 
manipulated against her will? Which man did she know as her husband? Endless 
questions remained even at the point of judgment, and yet Arnaud du Tilh, the 
accused (the first man to return as ‘Martin Guerre’), was still condemned to death. 
While Montaigne expresses philosophical outrage that a judgment was given in a case 
‘so wondrous strange and so far-exceeding both our knowledge and his owne who 
was judge’, it is difficult to see a workable solution to the problem. It is not possible 
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for lawyers to emulate the Areopagites, as Montaigne suggests, and ask ‘the parties to 
come againe and appeare before them a hundred yeares after’, nor would even the 
passage of time make the case any clearer.
51
 Our only way of knowing the truth – 
whether in casual human interactions or at law – is by parsing meaning through a 
system of language that is inherently emotional, shifting and unstable. So how can we 
tell the truth of an assertion? What if our bonds are created by false words, or empty 
(yet professed) emotion?  
This anxiety about the multivalence of language is opened out by Jackie 
Watson’s discussion of early modern epistolary exchanges between Inns men, lawyers 
and courtiers in her essay ‘“My lodging is so near the Star Chamber that my pens 
shake in my hand”: Letters, Truth, And Lawyers’ Fears’. Examining the letters of Sir 
Thomas Overbury in particular, a prominent English political and legal figure, 
Watson highlights the multivalence of letter-writing as at once affectively binding, 
evidential, and potentially misleading. Drawing on the dramatic deployment of letters 
in John Webster’s The White Devil (1612), she further demonstrates the importance of 
context in determining their emotional and legal truth value. Richard Stacey examines 
anxieties about the reliability of professed emotion in verbal, rather than written, 
exchanges. In ‘The vow is made’: Communal Swearing and Succession in Titus 
Andronicus’, Stacey looks at the introduction and legal enforcement of the Oath of 
Allegiance, and shows how its effectiveness as an act of individual emotional 
subjugation was undermined by the impossibility of accessing the emotions and 
intentions that underpinned oath-making. Stacey consequently sees the communal 
acts of vowing in Shakespeare as politically powerful and transformative, as a result 
of the perceptible authenticity of such vows and their exploration of the idea that 
oath-making in Tudor England should properly be based in fellow-feeling. 
Both Watson’s and Stacey’s essays (and to some extent, all of the essays 
collected here) trace a prevailing fear of dissembling, deception and emotional 
manipulation. This capacity for deception features prominently on the early modern 
stage: take Shakespeare, for example, and Lady Macbeth’s insistence that her husband 
‘look like the innocent flower but be the serpent under’t’ (Macbeth, I. 5. 76), or 
Angelo’s sinister claim in Measure for Measure (1604) that ‘To have what we would 
have, we speak not what we mean’ (Measure, II. 4. 126).52 While eminent English 
jurist Sir Edward Coke claims that ‘Logick teacheth a man [...] to discern 
between truth and falshood’, like Vives and Montaigne he must acknowledge that 
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‘Truth and falsehood have both alike countenances, their port, their taste and their 
proceedings semblable.’53 The Renaissance of classical learning fostered a kind of 
intellectual scepticism that struck a chord with the doubts fuelled by the Reformation, 
and with this resurgence also came a heightened awareness, and suspicion, of 
rhetoric.
54
 For if, as Aristotle says, a rhetorician ‘must disguise his art and give the 
impression of speaking naturally and not artificially’ because ‘[n]aturalness is 
persuasive’ and ‘artificiality is the contrary’, how could anyone really expect to tell 
truth from falsehood?
55
 Rachel E. Holmes explores this quandary in ‘What’s the 
Matter? Murderous Husbands and “Adulterous” Wives in Early Modern English and 
Spanish Drama’. Holmes’s essay focuses on the epistemic gap of adultery and 
suggests that its unknowability leaves it vulnerable to the persuasive vividness of 
affective rhetoric. Jealous husbands fill in the gaps in their knowledge with suspicion. 
Exploring proof and emotional vulnerability, Holmes questions law’s capacity to 
regulate or discern, and its willingness to use, rhetorical effects.  
If history of emotions scholarship (in particular, the enormous investment in 
locating a suitable methodological framework) has demonstrated anything 
conclusively, it is that emotional agents consistently prove themselves to be unreliable 
and uncontrolled. Perhaps this very truth about humanity necessitates law and legal 
structures, or at least propels them. But, paradoxically, it is also precisely the 
unreliability and elusiveness of emotion that threatens the very foundations of any 
regulatory structures that are imposed. The systemic hazards of emotion drive 
Michael Scham’s ‘Revenge and Its Attenuation: Honour and Affect in Cervantes and 
Alemán’. For Scham, the ‘rhetoric of honour’ in early modern Spain uneasily 
straddles law and emotion, propelling tensions between formal legal jurisdictions and 
their affective counterparts in the revenge plots of Mateo Alemán and Miguel de 
Cervantes.
56
 However, Scham sees Cervantes and Alemán as productively negotiating 
the emotional fallout and divisiveness of honour culture through their emphasis on 
collaborative justice. Rounding off the collection, Todd Butler’s essay on ‘Emotion, 
Deliberation, and Authority in The Roman Actor’ also sees emotional and legal value 
in collaboration. Taking a Nussbaumian approach, Butler shows how Philip 
Massinger presents considered emotional reasoning as a beneficial political and legal 
alternative to rash, uninformed decision making. Butler suggests that Massinger’s 
play exposes the possibilities and promise of deliberative justice, thereby 
foreshadowing modern claims about the centrality of emotion to law. We end, then, 
 13 
on a positive and forward-looking note, which reframes the suspicion of emotion 
which characterized the early modern period and which runs through this volume. In 
doing so, we return to our opening questions about whether there might be a positive 
place for emotion in our political and legal systems. 
Our contributors are far from unanimous in their broader conclusions about 
law, emotion, and their interrelations. For us, though, the variety of work here does 
more than just showcase that the intersection between law, literature and emotion is a 
rich, relatively unmined, site for scholarly enquiry. The possibilities outlined by our 
contributors suggest, above all, that the material and methodology of literary studies 
offer both a critical framework and a vast body of imaginative and exploratory 
material capable of pushing beyond the ground already established by colleagues in 
cognitive and social sciences. This Special Issue attends to the urgency of 
Reformation and Counter-Reformation anxieties about truth and intention from an 
interdisciplinary and transnational perspective, and sees ‘truth’ – the spectre that 
haunts motive, intention and appearance – as a productive way of bringing together 
History of Emotions studies, and Law and Literature scholarship. Whether to 
determine the veracity of a claim or to evaluate the sincerity of professed feeling, both 
law and emotions seek to impose regulatory structures on human interactions, but 
while Michel de Montaigne suggests that truth has ‘no more faces than one’, we argue 
that human relationships with truth are anything but straightforward.
57
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